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Privacy,	
  conﬁden/ality,	
  personal	
  data	
  protec/on	
  &	
  copyright	
  
Privacy - is perhaps better understood as “the state of being let alone” [in line
with OED early definition] since the classic “right to be let alone” imports
such normative, if not legal, baggage. Legal protection in Canada variable.
Personal data protection - although clearly purposefully related to privacy, also
concerns encouraging data transfer (OECD Guidelines purpose section), and,
moreover, has been constructed in Canada, as elsewhere, as administrative
regimes that create statutory confidentiality, albeit in a very restricted subject
matter: personal data. Many Canadian businesses, including ISPs, governed
by PIPEDA.
Confidentiality -- embraces a wider subject matter than just personal data-- and
analytically and philosophically differs from privacy: Kim Scheppele
(Chicago, 1988), Elizabeth Neill (UWO, 2001). Often dealt with by contract.
Copyright infringement enforcement: Copyright Act, ss.35 & 38.1

Considering	
  the	
  roles	
  and	
  responsibili/es	
  of	
  ISPs:	
  
•

Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [SOCAN] v
Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427
[“Tariff 22” decision], per LeBel, J.

•

BMG Canada Inc v John Doe, 2005 FCA 193, [2005] 4 FCR 81, Sexton, J., for the
Court
See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Battleground between New and Old Orders: Control
Conflicts between Copyright and Personal Data Protection," in Ysolde Gendreau (ed.)
Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm -- Perspectives from Canada (Cheltenham (UK):
Edward Elgar, 2008), 227-266.

•

Ontario developments:
• Warman v Fournier et al 2010 ONSC 2126 (Ont Div Ct) [Charter-like concerns, not
PIPEDA; production from a party, not a third party, sought and denied]
• But 1654776 Ont. Ltd v Stewart, 2013 ONCA 184 (ONCA) overrules Warman in
favour of BMG approach…

•

Voltage Pictures LLC v John Doe and Jane Doe, 2014 FC 161(Aalto
(Prothonotary))

In	
  the	
  2004	
  “Tariﬀ	
  22”	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  case	
  the	
  Majority	
  did	
  not	
  
look	
  at	
  privacy,	
  but	
  Jus/ce	
  LeBel*,	
  dissen/ng	
  in	
  part,	
  did:	
  	
  
“[In concurring with the majority in part] Insofar as is possible, this Court
should adopt an interpretation … that respects end users’ privacy interests,
and should eschew an interpretation that would encourage the monitoring
or collection of personal data gleaned from Internet-related activity within
the home…”
“[In dissenting from the test adopted by the majority in “Tariff 22”], insofar
as it looks at the retrieval patterns of end users, encourages the monitoring
of an individual’s surfing and downloading activities. Such habits tend to
reveal core biographical information about a person. Privacy interests of
individuals will be directly implicated where owners of copyrighted works
or their collective societies attempt to retrieve data from Internet Service
Providers about an end user’s downloading of copyrighted works. We
should therefore be wary of adopting a test that may encourage such
monitoring.”
* Retiring from the Court November 30 (at mandatory 75).

Nonetheless,	
  Binnie	
  J,	
  for	
  the	
  Majority,	
  not	
  considering	
  
privacy,	
  did	
  write,	
  of	
  ISPs:	
  

“It is clear that Parliament did not want copyright disputes between
creators and users to be visited on the heads of Internet
intermediaries, whose continued expansion and development is
considered vital to national economic growth.”
(in holding that the music collective SOCAN cannot have a tariff
imposed upon ISPs)

(Justice Binnie left the Supreme Court in 2011.)

BMG	
  v.	
  John	
  Doe	
  –	
  FCA	
  2005	
  
Sexton, J, for himself and Noel, J, and Richard, CJ, May 19, 2005, on
appeal from the judgment of Justice Finckenstein, March 31, 2004:
“Modern technology … must not be allowed to obliterate those
personal property rights which society has deemed important.
Although privacy concerns must also be considered, it seems to me
that they must yield to public concerns for the protection of
intellectual property rights in situations where infringement threatens
to erode those rights.”
The Supreme Court “Tariff 22” decision was not discussed (nor was it
discussed in the 2014 Voltage Pictures case).

Two	
  diﬀerent	
  contexts	
  of	
  “privacy”	
  in	
  BMG	
  v.	
  John	
  Doe	
  (2005)	
  
and	
  again	
  in	
  Voltage	
  Pictures	
  (2014):	
  
OLD

NEW

• “the legitimate privacy concerns”
• referred to in the 5th branch of
the test for granting equitable bills
of discovery –
• Which, in BMG, the FCA found
were the 5 tests to be applied in
determining discovery under
Federal Court Rule 238;
•Approach continued in 2014
Voltage Pictures

PIPEDA – came into force for ISPs
on January 1, 2004 –
• except in Quebec, first PRIVATE
sector personal data protection in
Canada
• 2 months before the lower court
decision in BMG v John Doe
• acknowledged in BMG by Justice
Finckenstein and then FCA – BUT, I
have argued, not properly
incorporated
• quoted in Voltage Pictures, but,
again, not actually used in the
decision

Note	
  actual	
  outcome	
  in	
  BMG	
  FCA:	
  
The FCA dismissed the appeal – thus the applicants did not get the order
against the ISPs requiring that they disclose the identities of the 29
users -- BUT
even Justice Sexton describes the outcome as a “divided success” –
the dismissal was “without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to commence
a further application for disclosure of the identity of the [users]”…
The loss turned on the FCA’s view that much of the affidavit evidence
presented was hearsay and (as Justice Finckenstein had also worried
in the lower Federal Court) too much time had passed between the
gathering of the evidence to support the motion and the decision and
that the identities of those holding the accounts, who had been using
the pseudonyms, might have changed in the interval and thus the fifth
branch of the test was not met – but only in the proceeding before
them.

BMG	
  on	
  privacy,	
  personal	
  data	
  protec/on	
  and	
  copyright:	
  
•

The FCA decision on the first factor, the bona fide claim, was that the
test is only whether the APPLICANT PLAINTIFFS “really do intend to
bring an action for infringement of copyright based upon information
they obtain, and that there is no improper purpose for seeking the
identity of these persons.”
Ø This test is so low that there is no real opportunity, in ISP cases, to
argue about whether the defendant users would have defences such as
fair dealing or private copying available to them…
Ø But, the gist of my argument against the reasoning( but not the result)
of the BMG FCA decision, lies with the 5th step of the test for this type
of order against “third parties” (in this case the ISPs) that the FCA
endorsed (the order is often called a “Norwich order”)

•

TEST FACTOR 5:
The FCA said public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh
the legitimate privacy concerns.

Sexton,	
  wri/ng	
  BMG	
  FCA	
  judgment,	
  juxtaposed	
  privacy	
  and	
  intellectual	
  
property	
  and,	
  in	
  doing	
  so,	
  oversimpliﬁed	
  the	
  no/on	
  of	
  privacy:	
  
•
•
•
•
•

All cases cited by Sexton were decided prior to the implementation of PIPEDA
(January 1, 2004)
In Canada, there has been a real confusion, certainly popularly, and even
amongst scholars, between personal data protection and privacy.
Personal data protection had come to govern much of the public sector since
1977 – but always as a companion to access legislation.
PIPEDA is ONLY personal data protection legislation: there is no balancing
legislated right of access to data in the private sector.
Sexton cited Glaxo Wellcome v. Revenue Canada as authority for priorizing
disclosure; but that case stands for the proposition that a litigant seeking
production of documents from a public sector institution need not apply under
access legislation but can, instead, seek a court order for production:
obviously the balances should be different where no access legislation is
involved. This confusion about Glaxo Wellcome and the fact that it is not a
personal data protection case continued in the Stewart case in the ONCA
overruling the Divisional Court’s Warman v Fournier approach.

I	
  argue	
  that	
  Factor	
  5	
  should	
  be	
  sa/sﬁed	
  with	
  reference	
  to	
  
PIPEDA	
  in	
  cases	
  such	
  as	
  these:	
  
Whether the public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh the
legitimate privacy concerns…
This is precisely the point of PIPEDA in the private sector:
“to establish rules [for organizations engaged in commercial activities]… in a
manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to
their personal information… and the need of [such] organizations [for]
personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would
consider appropriate.” (s.3)
While, as the cases accept (of course the users were not parties to the
motions, although some are the targetted defendants), a custodial
organization must, under PIPEDA, disclose information only under a court
order, the entire thrust of the legislation is against disclosure of personal
data held by private organizations.

	
  Factor	
  5:	
  The	
  public	
  interests	
  in	
  favour	
  of	
  disclosure	
  must	
  
outweigh	
  the	
  legi/mate	
  privacy	
  concerns.	
  
	
  
Justice Sexton’s reasoning in
BMG was circular:
“Privacy rights are significant and
they must be protected. In order to
achieve the appropriate balance
between privacy rights and the
public interest in favour of
disclosure, PIPEDA [permits
disclosure if there is a court order
and that provision of PIPEDA is to
be used to determine whether
there should be a court order].”
Prothonotary Aalto found himself
bound by the previous decision of
his higher court, the FCA…

PIPEDA legislates those interests
in disclosure that transcend
personal data protection:
inter aliato a government institution for
purposes of
• National defence or security
• Conduct of international affairs
• Enforcing or administering laws…
Nowhere are the interests of
private litigants or IP rights holders
placed ahead of personal data
protection.

What	
  are	
  the	
  dangers	
  of	
  the	
  Federal	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeal’s	
  approach?	
  
ISPs could be ordered to reveal the identities of users in any case where
a plaintiff can show a bona fide rather than prima facie interest in
pursuing litigation:
Divorce
Debtor creditor
No qualitative difference under Rule 238 between civil intellectual
property claims and any other claim.
PIPEDA is rendered unstable, to say the least, in the context of
businesses being conducted on the internet.

Would	
  the	
  plain/ﬀs	
  be	
  le^	
  without	
  a	
  remedy	
  if	
  PIPEDA	
  actually	
  
governed	
  disclosure	
  in	
  such	
  a	
  case?	
  
Qualified releases such as those contemplated by Justice Sexton and
Prothonotary Aalto are not possible under PIPEDA – the information is
either released or not released, whereas Justice Sexton suggested
orders for use of initials to identify the parties in litigation proceedings
or use of a confidentiality order to keep the proceedings confined to
the parties and Prothonotary Aalto uses the Case Management system
to maintain oversight on plaintiff.
But, under strict PIPEDA, if the identities of the alleged defendants come
to the plaintiffs’ attention from any source other than the ISPs, there is
nothing to prevent the plaintiffs from launching their civil infringement
actions.
Or, if criminal proceedings are contemplated against these users, the
discovery process is decided under other rules and, should it be
relevant, the public interest is more clearly discerned than in disputes
between private litigants.

Where	
  records	
  are	
  involved,	
  personal	
  data	
  protec/on	
  governs	
  
-‐-‐	
  
As agreed by the parties to the contracts (user agreements) involved,
users share confidential information with their ISPs:
– these confidences form the subject matter of records which are the
subject of legislated personal data protection, in this case, under
PIPEDA,
-- the legislation already makes the trade off between privacy values
and data sharing values for those organizations subject to it (including
ISPs),
-- therefore, on an application for discovery such as was before the
Fed Ct and then FCA in BMG v. John Doe and Fed Ct in Voltage
Pictures v John Doe and Jane Doe, the question of the public interest,
set out as part 5 of the test for discovery, must, I argue, be answered
by the courts as the legislature has answered it in the relevant
personal data protection regime, in this case PIPEDA.
Thank you…

